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AGENCY
JAMs F. DP.Enm
Few decisions of the Supreme Court during the review period
turned directly upon an application of Agency Law, most of the
references to agency rules being made by way of secondary or
"back up" holdings. For example, the holding in Bulova Watch
Co. v. Roberts Jewelers,' was based primarily on the languages
of the orders and correspondence concerning the orders for a
shipment of watches. The court allowed the vendor, Bulova, to
look for payment to the retail jeweler as an individual vendee
rather than as a corporate vendee. The jeweler had organized
the corporation and then allowed its charter to be cancelled for
failure to pay taxes. This evidence was found to show that, at
least from Bulova's viewpoint, the jeweler was trading as an
individual and pledging his own credit-a conclusion which the
court also found to be supported by some probably unintentional
concessions in the statement contained in the transcript of record.
In the last paragraph of Mr. Justice Brailsford's opinion the
rule is stated that "one who undertakes to order and receive
goods for a non-existent principal represents no one, and binds
himself to pay the purchase price."2 The principle is sound and
does not involve the complication discussed by Professor Folk
in last year's Agency Survey article3 on the somewhat analagous
question of whether an agent who contracts in excess of his au-
thority is liable on the contract or for breach of his implied
warranty of authority. The authorities seem to be in agreement
that where no principal exists at all, one who purports to con-
tract for that principal is contracting for himself and his liabil-
ity is on the contract.
4
Again in Small v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co.5 the court had
decided the case before it came to the agency point. An insured
* Lecturer in Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 240 S.C. 280, S.E.2d 643 (1962). This case is also noted in the Pleading
section at note 23 and in the Corporations section at note 28.
2. Id. at 285, citing Medlin v. Ebenezer Methodist Church, 132 S.C. 498,
129 S.E. 830 (1925) and Lagone v. Timmerman, 46 S.C. 372, 24 S.E. 290
(1896).
3. 15 S.C.L. REv. 30 (1963). In conjunction with his discussion of Skinner
& Ruddock, Inc. v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 239 S.C. 614, 124 S.E.2d 178
(1962), Professor Folk reviews the South Carolina decisions holding an un-
authorized agent liable on the contract itself.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 326 (1958); 2 Am. Jur. Agency
§ 316 (1939).
5. 241 S.C. 344, 128 S.E.2d 175 (1962). This case is also noted in the In-
surance section at note 17.
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under a health policy had brought an action for benefits due and
for a judicial declaration that the policy was in full force and
effect. The insurer defended on the ground that the plaintiff
had misrepresented his history of health in making application
for the policy. Judge Epps of the Civil Court of Horry County
granted the plaintiff's relief and enjoined the insurer from can-
celling the policy as long as the premiums were paid. The Su-
preme Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, affirmed. The
gist of the opinion was that the insured's statements in the appli-
cation concerning his medical history were not warranties but
mere misrepresentations, the application form only calling for
answers to the "best of the applicant's knowledge." The agency
ruling was simply that if the insurer's soliciting agent had knowl-
edge of the applicant's physical condition, such knowledge was
binding upon his principal.
The case of fcPherson v. United Am. Ins. Oo.6 was also con-
cerned with the actions of a health insurance solicitor. This one
collected a full year's premium, remitted only a fourth of it to
his company for a three month's policy and pocketed the balance.
A judgment by the Civil Court of Florence County for actual
and punitive damages against the insurance company for con-
version of the insured's money was affirmed. The defendant
argued on appeal that when the agent received the premium
money, it came into the possession of the insurance company with
the insured entitled to a year's coverage. Therefore, the con-
version was a matter between the company and its agent. The
court, speaking again through Chief Justice Taylor, held that
this would be true if the insured had elected to stand on the
policy's coverage for a year, but he could not be compelled to
do so. He has the alternative right, according to the court, to
call the agent's act conversion and sue the principal for that tort.
Although as a matter of law the money did go exactly where the
insured intended it to go, i.e., into the possession of the insurer,
and the insured did get what he paid for, i.e., the right to a full
year's insurance, the court's conclusion that the transaction still
constituted an actionable wrong for which the principal could
be held under respondeat superior is probably sound. Certainly
there can be no defense on the ground that the agent's dealing
was for his own personal gain and was not in the real interests
6. 242 S.C. 28, 129 S.E2d 842 (1963). This case is also noted in the In-
surance section at note 23.
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of his principal.7 Granted this, the apparent anomaly of the
result reached in the instant case disappears on the court's rea-
soning that it was up to the insured to say whether it was his
money or the insurance company's money that the agent con-
verted. Probably the closest South Carolina case on the facts is
Medlin v. Southern Ry. Co.," where a punitive damages recovery
against the railroad company was allowed for its conductor hav-
ing taken a twenty dollar bill for the plaintiff's fare and pock-
eted the change that was due him.
Martin v. Southern Ry. Co. 9 was an action by the plaintiff for
his wrongful discharge as a railway conductor. The defendant
maintained that he had been properly discharged under one of
its operating rules which prohibited the use of intoxicating liquor
while on duty. Defendant further contended since the plaintiff
had been given an administrative hearing on the propriety of
his discharge pursuant to a provision of the contract made on
his behalf by the Railroad Brotherhood and the company and
the results of the hearing had been adverse to the plaintiff, the
matter was concluded. Therefore the present action could not be
maintained in the absence of a showing of bad faith or arbitrary
conduct on the defendant's part. Circuit Judge Martin accepted
this argument and directed a verdict for the defendant, but the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bussey, reversed.
The gravamen of the decision, which was supported by cases from
other jurisdictions, mainly federal, was that the contract with the
Brotherhood should not be interpreted as making the employer
"the sole and final arbiter of whether the plaintiff was guilty
or innocent. Whether or not he was wrongfully and unlawfully
discharged depends upon whether or not he was in fact guilty
of the conduct charged." The court added that, on the retrial,
the defendant would have the burden of proving that the dis-
charge was for proper cause.
Jackson v. Powe'0 and BeZlamy v. Hardee" were actions for
the injury of an employee through the alleged negligence of the
employer. In Jackson v. Powe the plaintiff was hurt by a bale
of cotton falling upon him while he was assisting in loading
7. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 261, 262 (1958).
8. 143 S.C. 91, 141 S.E. 185 (1928).
9. 240 S.C. 460, 126 S.E.2d 365 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Administrative Law section at note 101.
10. 241 S.C. 35, 126 S.E.2d 841 (1962). This case is also noted in the Torts
section at note 12.
11. 242 S.C. 71, 129 S.E.2d 905 (1963). This case is also noted in the Torts
section at note 11.
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bales on his employer's truck at the platform of a third party's
cotton gin. The bales were being loaded by means of a hydraulic
lift belonging to the gin company and operated by one of its
employees. The Supreme Court, in affirming Circuit Judge
Baker's order granting the nonsuit, held that the defendant
could not be held liable for the negligent operation which injured
the plaintiff since such operation was not under the defendant's
control. There is an exception, the court said, to the general rule
that a master is under a non-delegable duty to provide his ser-
vant with reasonably safe instrumentalities and a reasonably safe
place to work. This exception exists where the instrumentality or
place is furnished by, or under the control of, a third party. The
holding seems to be in accord with the general authorities,12
which point out that under such circumstances the injured worker
could well have an action against the owner of the premises for
his failure to keep them, or the machinery thereon, in a safe
condition. It should be borne in mind that the rule relied upon
in the principal case does not apply where the employer of the
injured worker is performing work on the foreign premises pur-
suant to a contract with the owner or someone else. In such cases
the employer "must exercise for the safety of his employees the
care which the law requires of him respecting his own prem-
ises.111
In Bellamy v. Hardee,14 the plaintiff was injured while re-
moving the middle section of the boom on the dragline which he
operated for the defendant. To permit the joining of the bolt
holes on the two remaining boom sections, one of them had to be
raised slightly and an ordinary automobile bumper jack was pro-
vided by the employer and regularly used by the employee for
that purpose. On the occasion of the injury, the jack had "strip-
ped," causing the boom to fall and throwing the plaintiff down.
The primary contention of the plaintiff was that the bumper
jack was inadequate and unsuitable for this particular use and
that the defendant should have provided a hydraulic jack. The
difficulty of maintaining this position lay in the fact that the
plaintiff, by his own testimony as well as that of the defendant,
was in complete charge of the dragline operation. He knew at
least as much as the defendant did about what was used in the
12. 35 Am. Jur. Master & Servant § 174 (1939) ; 56 C.J.S. Master & Servant
§ 219 (1954).
13. 35 A?. JUR. Master & Servant § 174 (1939).
14. 242 S.C. 71, 129 S.E.2d 905 (1963).
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operation and had been told to let the defendant know if any-
thing was needed. There was no evidence that the desirability of
substituting a hydraulic jack for the bumper jack was ever
called to the defendant's attention.
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bussey, held that even
if it could be said that the defendant was negligent in providing
an inadequate jack, the plaintiff was also negligent in continuing
to use the jack and failing to ask for better equipment. This
negligence on the the part of the plaintiff was clearly the im-
mediate and proximate cause of the injury. Ordinarily the
master's duty to furnish the servant with a reasonably safe place
to work and reasonably safe tools is a non-delegable one. How-
ever, where the injured servant is in complete charge of the work
and stands as a vice principal of the master, he cannot recover
if he has been negligent in performing the delegated duty of
keeping the premises and the tools in a safe condition. The hold-
ing seems to be in accord with generally recognized principles.1"
It was held in Eberhardt v. Fomrester'0 that a prospective pur-
chaser trying out an automobile was not a servant of the auto-
mobile dealer. The dealer may be liable for turning over a de-
fective instrumentality to his bailee, but there is no room for
respondeat superior responsibility.
Marshall v. Thomason17 contained a very important holding,
but one which is more properly commented upon in Evidence
article. The post-accident admissions of a servant-driver were
held not admissible against the master.
In Johnson v. Livingston"8 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decided, under South Carolina law, whether a servant who
is doing something that he believes should be done on the master's
behalf is acting within the scope of his employment. One Barnes,
a regular and somewhat pampered employee of the defendant,
had, on the date preceding the accident in question, used the de-
fendant's stake body truck to deliver poles for his own profit to
a third party. In returning from this private project, the truck
broke down and the man for whom Barnes had been working
took him to the defendant's house to get permission to use a pick-
15. 35 Am. Jur. Master & Servant §§ 142, 143 (1939) ; 56 C.J.S. Master &
Servant § 204(b) (1954).
16. 241 S.C. 399, 128 S.E.2d 687 (1962). This case is also noted in the Torts
section at note 39.
17. 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E2d 177 (1962). This case is also noted in the Torts
section at note 47.
18. 315 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963).
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up truck to pull the stake body truck out of danger. It was late at
night and the defendant irately refused permission. Barnes
waited in the defendant's yard until he had gone to sleep, took
the pickup, persuaded a neighbor that the defendant wanted
him to help in the transaction, and undertook to pull home the
illfated stake body. The two trucks became tangled with each
other and blocked the road to such an extent that an approaching
automobile crashed into them and killed the plaintiff's intestate.
The court reversed a judgment of the South Carolina District
Court against the truck owner, holding that Barnes was clearly
"engaged in a project of his own in direct violation of his em-
ployer's orders." It was immaterial that Barnes thought that
what he was doing would be helpful to the employer. The South
Carolina case of Holder v. Haynes" is correctly relied upon in
support of the holding.
The federal court makes no reference to the so-called Osteen2 °
presumption, under South Carolina law, that "when one is found
in possession of the property of another, using it in the service
of the owner, he is presumed to be the servant of the owner."
Under the facts of the case, however, the presumption would be
of little significance in an appellate court since rebuttal evi-
dence can be so strong as to completely destroy the presumption
and require a direction of verdict.
21
19. 193 S.C. 176, 7 S.E.2d 833, Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 128 (1940).
20. Osteen v. South Carolina Cotton Oil Co., 102 S.C. 146, 86 S.E. 202
(1915).
21. Watson v. Kennedy, 180 S.C. 543, 186 S.E. 549 (1936).
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